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BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
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In and For Salt Lake County, Utah
The. Honorable Leonard W. Elton, Judge
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12101

BRIEF O:F' APPELLANTS

OF rrHE CASE
This was an action upon a "contract for deed" to recover taxes allegedly paid by plaintiff for the years 1963
through 1966.
DISPcmrrnoN IN LOWER COURT
The District Court awarded the plaintiff the sum of
$1433.26 togt>ther with interest and costs.

2
Rl£LlBF SOl'<i I IT ();\ .\PPBAL
App(•llant sepk,.; a IT\'l'l'sal
alkrnatin• a IW\\' trial.

or th(· j1Hlg1tl('l1t or in

th('

On or abont U1L'
da>· of ,\ugu,.;t, 1%:J, tl1e iiarties
entered into a ''('.ontrad for d\•t•d" \\'herein the plaintiff
agreed to sdl and tlw dPJ'enclnnts agTPl'd to buy certain
pro1wrt:-- in Salt Lah ( 'ounty, lltnh, (Exhibit 1-P ).
contract providl·d, a111011g· other thing·s, that dd(•nda11l
"shall keep all taxt•s paid."
Defendm1ts ('J1t1c·n·d i11to lJOSSPssion or :-;aid premises
and made the n.·qni1wl monthly payments until approximately ,Januar:-· :20, 1%7, \\'lien dd'endants, having an
opportu11it>- to
said prop(·rt:-·, eontacted the plaintiffs
and reqtwsfr(l thl')' wain tlwir "t'irst refusal option to
purf'liase '' ( gxhibit 1-P).
Plaintiffs agP11t, l\Lr. (ionlon \Yirick, obtairn_.d such
a waivL'l' l'ro111 plaintiff's llorne Office in BartlesvilP,
Oklahoma, a11d th<·n·afkr, on apprnxirnatel."· FPhruary 20,
1!JG7, the <ld°l-'IHlan t
fl art, aga ill cont nd<•tl
·wi rick,
plaintiff's agP11t, and infornH·d him that his first 1-\ale had
fallen througl1 lmt tltat he no\\· had a Sl'('OIHl opportunity
to sPll the p1·01H·rt:·; and again n·q tll'StPd tlw waiver. Said
\\-aivPl' was fnrnishl·d to tliP <ld l·11<1ants wlio tl1<>reupon rP0

qtwstPd a pn,Yo\'\' l\<_>,·ttr•· ou tliP <'Ont rnd for Lked, (H. fl'.!).

Aft.,1· s\'veral eo11v1·rsntion:-:

\>('t\\'('\'Jl

:\lr. Hart and plaill-

8
ti lTs agent:-;, sueh a figure was furnishe(l in tlt(· amount
of $i3,5Ul.:)9, (H. 5:2, :->:I). D(>t'endants paid said snm to the
plaintiff, (R. 5-1:), anJ un or about March 1:), 19G7, plaintifl's dPlinred to tlie Jefrndants a "special
d< ·< ·<1," ( R GO, 1£xhibi t 10-D).
Tlwreafter, by ldter dated November 17, 1967, plaintiffs made a daim against the defendants for taxes they
had allegedly paid on said property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS N"O EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OTHER
THAN HEARSAY, ADl\IITTED OVER OBJECTION, AS TO
THE AMOUNT OR PAYl\IENT OF ANY TAXES ON SAID
PROPERTY BY THE PLAINTIFFS.

ri'he only

other tlwn the defendant, Mr. Hart,

(•t-tlkd by tlw plaintiff ·was Mr. Gordon ·wirick, an em-

ployee of

who tt>stified that said taxes "had

lwen paid by Phi Ui l's PC'trolem·1 Company.'' Plaintiffs immediate I.\· objected and moved to strike; the court owrniled tlw ohj<>dion, (R. Cl,!,). HoweyPr, shortly thereafter
the following occuned:
COURrl': Pardon me a minute. Mr. Hatch,
in regard to yom· last objection, is there any real
issne in this C'asl', during these years, that Phillips
did or did not pay some $1,200 in real property
taxes°!
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l\H{. HA'!'(' 11 : 'l'lwy ha n· billed u:,.; for th('rn i:.:
what ::-;tarted this lawsuit. I <l(ln't know whether
they have imid tl1l'lll or not, your Honor.

THE COLTH'l': lt wouldn't he nry difficult to
find out, would it t

.MR H A'l'Cll : In fad thev shonld have a record
of it if they han paid tlH'm:
Tl-IE COl;R'L1: They might.

MR HA'f1CH: ,.\nd that's where my objection
would be ba8ed."
Thereafter, l\lr. \Viriek t('stifiPcl that plaintiff's tax
insurance and claims office in Denver, Colorado, was the
place where tax notices wen' received from County Assessors and wlH'r0 taxes were paid, (R. 59). Further,
that the ledger sht>et8 containing the tax basis on property being sold nnder contract were kept in Denver, (R.
63).
\Vhik again, at R ()fl, in resvonse to a leading question h)' the eomt, Mr. Wirick testified that the taxes
were paid by Phillips, it is dear from the foregoing that
he had no personal
a8 to wlwther tlH' taxes had
heen paid h)· plai11tiff, or the amount of said
taxes.
'l'he
other references to the amount or payment
of tlwsp tax<·s
plaintiff an• eontained in Exhibits
2-P, 3-P, -t-P, :i-P, 7-P and 9-P, wl1ich again, were admitted owr ohjedion (lt
-lc9 and :JO).
2-P and

:;_pan• letters trnrn the plaintiff to :Hr. Hart and the only
f01mdation l'or their ad1mssion was 1\Ir. Hart's testimony
that lie had receivPd sarne. 'l'hm;, their only purpose would
be to show that a claim had been llla<le against 1lr. Ha1·t
and not for the proof of
truth of any statemenh; made
then•in. 1£xhibits 4:-P and G-P, while tlwy were identified
by Mr. Wirick a::o lettt>rs he had \vTitten, indicate that the
information
as to the taxes was furnished by a Mr.
Cowd1·>·, and as weviously noted, Mr. Wirick had already
h•stified that he had no personal knowledge as to the
payment or the amount of said taxes. The same is true
of Exhibit 7-P, while
9-P is in the same category
a:-; Exhibits 2-P and 3-P.

Thus, other tlwn hearsay, there is no evidence in the
record to support the court's finding (R. 26) that "the
plaintiff has paid said taxes and that the amount of
taxes duP are as follows: 1963 taxes (prorated from September 12, 1963,
days at 9:lc iwr day: 1963-$3-10.36,
1964- $122.76, 19C5 1965- $-illl.88, 1966$356.67." (It should be noted that even thE\ "hearsay"
won't support thes1' fignres !) (I1J:xhibit 7-P)
'l'here must lw competent admissible evidence upon
which a finding is based. Without such evidence a purported finding is ineffective to support a judgment. As
well discussed by .Justice Wade in his concnrring opinion
in John C. Gittler A:;:;ociation t'. DeJay Stores, 3 Utah 2d
107 at page 115:

•"rh<:> liearsav
excludes only 'evidence of a
\\"hi Ph· is madL' other than by a witness

while te:st i l\ing at a hParing oHerPd to proY1·
the truth or tlw 111a1ter stated.' 8uch a :-;tate11wnt
is not ad111issilil,· lH·eauc;1• it \\otdd be w;ed as tPstimony of tla· l'Xistt·nce of the facts statl'd by a witnPss who cllw:s uot purrort to han' personal knowledge o[ tSnch fads, and the 1wrson making such
stakme11t 11·!10 has p<'l'sonal knowledge of such
facts is not a \\' itlll'tSS :-; ll lij uct to cro:ss-exarnination .
.. .
the 'quPstion is not whether tlH' statl'ments an' true, lint whet1H·r the>· were made' such
statemPnts tll'P not exclud(•d h.Y the rule against
hearsa.\'. On tl1i8 cpiestion \Vigmore says: 'The
theory of tlw
rule . . . is that when a
hnman nttt>ran<'e is offl'H'd as e1·idc•nce of the trutl1
of the fact asserted in it, till' cn'dit of the assertor
hecome.s tl1P basis of onr inference and, thereforr
the astSertion ('an he
only \\·hen mad<'
npon the stand :-mbject to the
of cross-exrunination. Tf, therdore, an Pxtra judicial utterance
is offer0d not a:;; an a;;sertion to Pviclence tlw
matter as:;;l'rtecl, lmt witl1ont r<>fe1·1·nc<' to the trnth
of tlw matter a:;;sert<>cl tht> HParsay rule does not
apply."
and further quoting 'Yigrnore,
.. rrlrns, the words an' used in no sense testii.P., as ass('rtions to evidence the truth
of a fad ass1•rtPcl iu thern. Ou th1· om' hand, tlH•refore, the hcarsa>· rule intc>rposcs no objection to
the llSl' of sueh ntkrn11e1•s hcl'anse they are not
off erecl as assertions ... on the other hand, so far
as tlH•\' nul\' contain asst•rtions, tl1ese are not to
he
01· ;{rgned about tPstirnonially nor heli1•wd
by tlw jury,
this \\·ould lie to nse tlwm in violation of' the If<·arsa\' rnle. [n short, tlH• 11tfrrances
Pnt('l' incsp<•<'ti\'(' of th<· trnth of
ass<•rtion
tlwY nia \. ro1dain nnd tlw\· n<'ith<'r profit nor snffer
hy
tl1ereof.''
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In Luke Shore Motor Couchliues, I11c. 1·. lrc/li11f;,
Utah 2d 114, although this \Vas a <.;ase inrnh·ing a hearing before rrhe Pnbli('
Commission, the court
stab·1-1 tltl' rnle as follows at page 118:
" ... a finding of fact nmnot lH'
solPlv on
Jwai·say e\·idenct> bnt it must lw SUlJ]>Orted by a
residuum of kgal L·vidence competent in a conrt
of law."
In },'phniim Vl'illoii· C1eek hriyation Company v.
Olse 11, 70 Utah 95, 2;)8 Pac. 21G at page 222:

''Although tltl' re1iresentation . . . was 11ot
specifically 1:·xc<:>pted to, it \Vas so obnoxious to the
general rule that we hold it to b(• of no probative
value. The error of tl1e court in admitting the
tl'stimony re [ent•d to
clearly prejndicial unless
the other eYidence in the case, standing alone,
justifies the finding ... "
And a Califor11ia court in Stevens v. illostachetti,
67 P.2d 809 at riage 310 states the rule as:
"Snch tnstimony was hearsay evidence and
objectionabll·: and under the rule that evidence
impro1wrly <'d1t1itted is not entitled to any weight
whatewr and is to be
none in considering
whether a finding of fact is sustained by the evisneh tPstimon:· must he disregarded by us.''
POINT II
THERE WAS AN ACCORD AND SATIFSACTION WHICH
DISCHARGED DEFE:'\DANT'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
CONTRACT.

8
During the lllOJlths of [i'chl'lU:ll'_\' and l\1arcl1 rn67 Mr.
Hart contacted
agents with regard to a waini1
of their first 01Jtio11 to purchas(' and a payoff figure on
the contract. Afkr seYeral meetings such a figure was
furnished, paid
'.\! r. Hart and a Special Wananty Deed
to the property delinred to him.
1 Am. Jur. :2d, Accord arnl 8atisfaction at page 340
states a8 follow8:

Payment of Obligation Before Maturity. It is well e8tabli8hed that when a debtor
his creditor lwl'ore the debt is due or before the
obligation to pay it has matured, an amount less
than the contract calls fo1· at the due date, and
the creditor accepts such payment in full satisfaction of the en ti re claim, 8nch payment affords a
sufficient consideration to support the creditor's
agree11wnt to accevt it in discharge of that claim.
indeed is a consideration which is not only
valuable to tlw creditor for the money may be
rnorP beneficial to him wlien received, and he gets
something which he eould not demand, bnt it is also
a detrirne11t to the debtor for he does that which
he i8 not bound to do and which may be detrimental to him in a practical sense."
Also 8Ce the airnotation in 24 A.L.R 1475 - Payment
of Part in Dischargt> of 'Whole' Deht, wherein the anno-

tation after stat i11g tht> ge1wrnl rnle 8tates:
1

•rL1 he rnIP, howm·er, does not apply to a pay-

ment made· l1efon' maturitv, however short the
int<c•nal. And so it i:-; <'sh1hlished, with praetically
no dis8ent, by the etrnes,
so111P
recogniz-

9
ing and others applying the doctri1w, -- that the
payme11t, hdun' maturity, of lesl:' than tlil' amount
of a liquidated and nndis1rnted claim, affords a
:oufficient consideration to support the creditor's
agreement to aecept it in disd1arge of the l·ntir('
claim."
Tlw transactions between these pal'ties c:ompletely
fits tlw foregoing, and it was not until some nine months
later that i)laintiff, hy letter, notified defendant that they
wanted an additional payment for taxes. ·with regard
to the consideration of the taxt•s in the negotiations to
arrive at a payoff figure, the 0;1ly direct testimony is that
of Mr. Hart (R. -±3), ·wherein he states:

"Q.

(TI:-- MR HATCH) 1 ou didn't ans'.ver his
last qm·stion, Mr. Hart, .Mr. Robbins' last
question was were taxes ever discnssed during
this

A.

Yes . . .

Q.

And who made the call?

A.

I made the call.

Q.

And wh('re did you make the call to?

A.

To Phillips Petroleum from Quarter 1fastPr's
right m• .'::t door to ·where the propnty ·was on
Second \Vest.

Q.

And :--on discussed at that time the pa>-off figure and the waiver of the option to purchase,
first option rd\ised, is tbat conect?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And \\-hat \ms said aho11t the taxes. if anything1

10
I C'alled thPlll 111i and said -- he µ:in· Ill<' tlii·
iia.Yoff, all cl T says, 'Is thi:,.; a corred payoff,'
and thl' man I talk<>d to said, 'Yes, this is it.
HP said, ·Did >·on enr pay taxt•s on that prop,\ml I said, 'No, I didn't.' H(• hesitah <l
a minnt(' and said, ·Well, we'll waive thl·
taxes.'
1

Q.

And it was aft<•r thi:-; that
check"?

A.

After that l gan· them a
erty, yes."

YOH

.

o·av<• them thl'

b

for tl1e lll'OlJ·

"\Vhile Mr. \Yiriek deni<·d that he had discussed tlH·
taxes with Mr. Hart, h<• did testify as follo1rn: (R. 63).

"Q.

Now, dming 2\farch and Fehrnary, out of
GO peopl<' in the
how many answered
phone calls and talked to people that the company 1rns doing bnsiness with about property
he sides >·omself ?
0

A.

How many would - I would be the only one
that
would talk to regarding a
of a cont rad other than two or three men in
our credit de.partment.

Q.

rrJH•n tlwre wen• two 01'
people in the
credit d<>partnwnt that conk! have talked to
l\fr. Hart or anyone ahont payoffs, is that
correct?

A.

Ir so!IH'Ollf' called in and n'qttested the payoff, the.\' would,

11
A.

One man, the credit rnarntw,r, \\-as .Ja: .Jolmson, and his assistant was l\Ir. Schw•ider.''

urn·ontradicted (•vidence in
Tlrns, the only
the record is that an agent of tlw plaintiff agreed to inclusion of tlw taxes in the payoff figure.
Howevei·, <>n•n if this \\'('l'<' not the case, the testimony of Mr. Wirick intlicates that Mr. Hart had never
lwPn informed of auy taxes assessl'd or paid and that
an)' tax assessments wen" rc•ceiwd by the plaintiff, (R.
:"i9). Thus, if there were a mistake, it
a unilateral
rnistake by the plaintiff, and as to information peculiarly within its kno\declge. The applieahlt> rnle is set
forth in 17 Arn . .Tur.
Contracts, page-ID2:
14G. Unilateral
or Error . . . . a
party to a contract canr-0t avoid it on the ground
that he made a mistake "-here tlH're has been no
misrepresPntntion, then• is no ambiguity in the
tf'rms of the <'Ontract arnl the other eontractor has
no
of such mistak1; and acts in rwrfeet good
faith. A unilateral error, it has hef'n said, does not
avoid a contract."
In Ashu·orth c. Clwrlrsu•o,·th, 231 P.2d 72-1 at pagl'
7'27 the eourt (1uote;;; with apprO\·al thl· following rnle:

"But if unilateral mistake, "-here then" i;;;
no fraud or inequitnblP conduct, is
to he regarded as sufficient ground for the rescission of a
hilakral contrad, there is more rPason wh:v a
conrt of c•qnity should confine its jmisdiction to
th<• party sePking relief has lwe11
cases

12
free from iwgligence, sinet> thP blamP of the :-;itnation lies
on the 1iarty st>eking rdief."
Also see the annotation "l:nilaternl
cission" at 59 A.L.R. 809.
Here the trial judge apparPntly completely disregarded the evidence of an acl'.ord and satisfaction since
he failed to make any finding on this subject, (R. 26).
Even though defendants filed an objl'ction to such findings of fact and conclusions of law pointing out this omission, (R. 23), the comt, summarily, without findings or
discussion, denied said objection and by inference plaintiff':-; alternatin' motion for a new trial, (R. 29).

CONCLUSION
plaintiff failt:·d to carry the burden of proof as
to its damages by failing to adduce any competent material nonhearsay evidence establishing that it had paid
any taxes or the amount thereof.
Further, the evidence of record clearly establishe::;
there was an accord and satisfaction which discharged
defendant's obligations under the contract.
Consequently, the judg1nent of tlw trial court should
be reversed, or in the alternative, remanded for a nl'\\'
trial.
Respectfully submitted,
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& KINGHORN
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